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Introduction
The early decades of the twenty-first century have witnessed the failure of climate change politics. The failure is not principally with the physical science evidence for climate change, which as a scientific hypothesis is increasingly robust, although still evolving and variously contested. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports articulate the widelyheld but conservative consensus around the physical science of climate change: the climate system is now warming significantly and is likely to continue, human activities are the major cause of it and potentially large impacts are likely (IPCC 2013) .
The fifth IPCC report predicts significant increases in surface warming and sea level by the end of this century. It identifies 'severe, widespread and irreversible' impacts on natural systems, water resources, species, crop yields, human health, social processes (including gender, class, ethnicity, age and disability), extreme weather, poverty and violent conflicts at global, regional, national and local scales (IPCC 2014) . The IPCC suggests a range of technologies and measures to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, along with steps to adapt to extreme weather and other current effects.
Rather, the failure is first of all political. Climate change politics proceeds on the basis of 'an extraordinarily limited understanding of the social world' and is for the most part 'untouched by theoretical debate of any kind at all' (Shove 2010: 278) . The dominant climate frames are 'an expert and elitist discourse in which peoples, societies, citizens, workers, voters and their interests, views and voices are very much neglected'. Climate politics often concentrates on the post-hoc consequences and 'ignores the conditions and causes which produce and reproduce the climatic (and other) problems' (Beck 2010: 254-5, 260 ). The Stern Review contains 'no analysis of power or of the tense nature of international relations'. In short 'we have no politics of climate change' (Giddens 2009: 201, 4) . Swyngedouw (2010: 219, 223 ) is scathing about the hegemonic framings of climate change, which invoke 'a common condition or predicament, the need for common humanity-wide action [and] mutual collaboration'. There are no social tensions or internal generative conflicts: global humanity is called into being as political subject, thereby 'disavowing the radical 3 heterogeneity and antagonisms that cut through "the people"'. Climate change discourse does not currently have a 'positively embodied name or signifier; it does not call a political subject into being that stands in for the universality of egalitarian democratic demands'. Climate change challenges the dominant political economy all the way down, hence the demand for a radical reframing by many climate activists.
Mature political science requires a mode of analysis and corresponding social ontology 'capable of reconciling structural and agential factors within a single explanation'. Structure and agency is not so much a problem as 'a language by which ontological differences between contending accounts might be registered'. Structure includes context and refers to the setting within which social, political and economic events occur and acquire meaning, while agency refers to action, specifically political conduct. Agency can be defined as 'the ability or capacity of an actor to act consciously and, in so doing, to attempt to realise his or her intentions' (Hay 2002: 113, 91-4) .
The relevance of structure and agency to climate politics has been recognised by some scholars (Berkhout and Hertin 2000; McLaughlin and Dietz 2008; Okereke, Bulkeley and Schroeder 2009) . However this has not resulted in greater clarity about the structures that might constrain or enable action, nor which agents might constitute the privileged subject of change.
The dominant approach to climate change frames the physical science evidence (distilled by the IPCC) within already established economic and political assumptions. The political economy of carbon is increasingly conducted by, through and for markets (Newell and Paterson 2009; ibid 2010) . The orientation towards markets is a neoliberal approach. Among the central elements of neoliberalism is a 'near worship of the "self-regulating market"', a market 'increasingly wide in its geographic scope, comprehensive as the governing mechanism for allocating all goods and services, and central as a metaphor for organising and evaluating institutional performance'. Neoliberalism involves minimally 'the subjection of more-and-more areas of social and environmental life to the logics of capital accumulation' (Heynen et al 2007: 15) . Nordhaus (2008: 22) sums up this approach in pithy fashion: 'Whether someone is serious about tackling the global-warming problem can be readily gauged by listening to what he or she says about the carbon price.' This is reflected in market mechanisms such as the European Union's Emissions Trade Scheme (EU ETS) and in national government policies. 4 Mol, Spaargaren and Sonnenfeld (2009) identify ecological modernisation as a distinct framing within environmental sociology and politics. The theory necessarily involves the 'active engagement' of the state, requiring 'strategic planning and the promotion of structural change at the macroeconomic level' (Murphy and Gouldson 2000: 35) . Mol and Jänicke (2009: 19) argue that in stronger versions of ecological modernisation, a range of state and non-state actors such as 'producers, insurance companies, consumers, retailers, unions, credit institutions and market institutions' are considered capable of working for environmental reform. Another distinctive feature of ecological modernisation is its engagement with important aspects of climate justice. This applies to both procedural justice, meaning the degree of recognition and participation of different actors; and distributive justice, which refers to the distribution of the beneficial and adverse effects of climate change and adaptation (Adger, Paavola and Huq 2006) . Barry and Paterson (2004: 767) argue that although the Blair-led Labour government promoted the neoliberal globalisation for British political economy, its environmental policies were 'best understood as an attempt to implement something like an ecological modernisation agenda'.
A third approach was pioneered by the Marxist geographer Neil Smith, who advanced the apparently scandalous proposal that 'labour is the ontological key to understanding how nature is produced' (Smith 2011: 262) . This focus on productive activity was a 'politically inspired move' aimed at placing labour at the centre of ecological politics (Ekers and Loftus 2013: 235) .
The foremost metaphor in contemporary Marxist framings of nature-society relations mediated by labour is the notion of metabolism (Schmidt 1971; Foster 2000) . Metabolism suggests a dialectical interdependence between nature and society, and is used in three senses: to define how labour mediates the relationship between society and nature; to describe how class societies generate metabolic rifts in the ecology of the earth; and to outline the systemic conditions necessary for metabolic restoration (Burkett 1999) . This Capital-centric Marxism contributes insight into the political economy of climate change, highlighting both the structural drivers that cause climate change (in drives for profitable capital accumulation) and identifying key social actors in the process, particularly the role of workers in affecting political economic action.
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Trade unions are regarded as quintessential class agents, although not necessarily as purveyors of a fully class-conscious outlook. Flanders (1970: 15) perceived the tension between trade unions functioning as a 'vested interest' and their role as 'swords of justice'. Trade unionism generates a series of contradictions, for example between conflictual oppositionists and cooperative partners. Hyman (2001: 3-4) attempts to capture the variable geometry of trade unionism: whether unions are a bargaining agent, a social partner, a mobiliser of discontent, or all of these at one and the same time. He argued that trade unions face in three directions. As associations of employees, they are concerned to regulate the wage labour relationship, the work performed and payments received. Unions cannot ignore the market. But as organisations of workers, they embody a conception of collective identity that divides them from employers.
Whether or not they endorse an ideology of class division and class opposition, 'unions cannot escape a role as agencies of class'. Yet unions also exist and function within a social framework, which they may aspire to change but which constrains their current choices. Survival necessitates 'coexistence with other institutions and other constellations of interest'. Unions are part of society.
Hyman points to three major ideal types of European trade unions: towards the market, society and class. In the first, unions are perceived as labour market institutions engaged in collective bargaining; in the second, unions focus on improving workers conditions and status in society, advancing social justice and equality; and in the third, they are schools of class conflict in the struggle between capital and labour. He illustrated these with reference to employment relations in Britain, Germany and Italy. Hyman (2012) accepts that his conception was a stylised model, which necessarily oversimplified and underplayed differentiation between trade unions within any national context. However the framing provides a useful heuristic for evaluating trade union engagement with climate change.
The relevance of Hyman's model for ecological questions has been noted (Räthzel and Uzzell 2011 ). Hyman's model can be extended by mapping the ecological and climate discourses onto trade unions. This mapping associates neoliberal climate discourse with the market pole; ecological modernisation with the social integration pole; and the Marxist perspective with the class pole (see Figure 1 ). Using this model, it is possible to deepen our understanding of the policies, behaviours and practices of trade unions with respect to climate change. unpaid, but semi-official climate role by their employer. Swaffield and Bell (2012: 249-50, 258) found that these champions 'consistently constructed the process of social change in neoliberal terms' and 'do not challenge the limits that neoliberalism imposes on how we can tackle the problem of climate change'. However participants also used a different set of discourses when asked about their own reasons for involvement in the scheme, appealing to ideas of justice, responsibility to future generations and 'doing the right thing'. Lewis and Juravle (2010: 490-1) found three distinct discourses articulated by climate champions: the neoliberal view that free markets can solve environmental problems; advocacy of some kind of government intervention; and a 'dissenter' view. A dissenter argued that 'the interests of capital, land (environment) and labour are not the same -they are constantly in conflict'. The idea that everyone to sit down and thrash it out amongst friends is 'flawed… typically labour and more 7 recently the environment, will always tend to be on the losing side'. The three-fold division between market, state and dissenter discourses is similar to the one utilised in this paper.
Aims and methods
The central There are both strengths and limitations of these research methods. Documents alone do not capture many of the perceptions and attitudes of organisations or social agents. Data derived 8 from official sources may be inadequate to some extent. They may be subject to bias or distortion, or bureaucracies' practical concerns may mean that data are not formulated in accordance with scholars' interests. However rather than viewing official documents as more or less biased sources of data, they 'should be treated as social products: they must be examined, not relied on uncritically as a research resource' (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007: 130-3) . The paper takes a critical stance towards trade union efforts to engage with climate change throughout.
Findings

Neoliberalism
As expected, the investigation revealed that some trade union framing of climate change are articulated in neoliberal terms. The accommodation was clearest with respect to market instruments such as EU ETS. The renewed priority given to climate change during the third term of the Labour government convinced many union officials to back EU ETS and use it for both environmental and industrial objectives. The TUC's assessment of Phase II recognised 'the central importance of the ETS in reaching the UK's Kyoto-plus commitments' and that the scheme was 'seen to be an effective market mechanism for participating member states'. It argued that development and offsetting projects should be subject to rigorous standards and 'independent evidence of employee engagement' (TUSDAC 2005: 1-3).
The high-level TUC view is pragmatic: EU ETS was better than no action by government and employers on climate change. They therefore sought to push through the market mechanism to win some bargaining gains. EU ETS was 'the most significant attempt by any nation, or set of nations, to impose an effective limit on greenhouse gas emissions' and 'by a long stretch the government's most effective market-based initiative to deliver cuts in carbon emissions through carbon pricing'. The TUC supported 'the auctioning of a higher percentage of allowances, particularly for the power generation sector, to avoid distortion of the carbon price' (TUSDAC 2007: 1-2).
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The TUC's assessment of Phase III stated that EU ETS was 'central to our shift to a low-carbon future'. It claimed that the success of the scheme was 'vital in securing a stable long-term policy framework, cutting greenhouse gas emissions and securing quality jobs and investment'.
However based on experience to date, TUC officials were concerned about 'the effectiveness of this approach and about the scope for market manipulation'. It urged the government to create 'a joint ETS policy-making forum with industry and trade unions to secure the scheme's huge potential environmental, economic and social benefits', an observatory to monitor and report on the industrial and employment impacts of the EU ETS in carbon-sensitive industries, and for auction revenues to establish a just transition fund supporting the rapid shift to low-carbon economic growth (TUC 2008d: 1-2, 9, 13).
TUC officials continued to support EU ETS during the coalition government, proposing a series of measures to help sustain a meaningful market price for carbon while meeting other goals.
The TUC supported the principle of a carbon tax to create a carbon price floor (TUC 2011: 73) . It argued that the billions of pounds of revenue from auctioning ETS permits and from the carbon price floor tax should be hypothecated to tackle issues such as fuel poverty (Pearson 2012a) . In fact TUC leaders identified a strategic retreat early in the coalition's term. Officials seized on a speech in which chancellor George Osborne blamed environmental regulations for piling costs on the energy bills of households and companies. Overall, the union verdict on the coalition government's climate credentials was scathing. Jacque Hatfield (Community) told the TUC Congress that the coalition's claims to be the greenest government ever was 'fast becoming the biggest sham ever' (TUC 2011b: 38). For unions, it became clear very quickly that blue and yellow had not produced green. Instead, coalition climate policy resembled a rather putrid mélange.
The concept of just transition is the most distinctive trade union framing of climate change politics to date and is usually expressed in ecological modernisation terms in trade union literature. Just transition was first articulated in international climate circles at the Kyoto 12 conference in 1997. Global unions told the gathering that in response to measures to tackle greenhouse gas emissions, 'workers will demand an equitable distribution of costs through "just transition" policies that include measures for equitable recovery of the economic and social costs of climate change programmes'. Companies, which had profited from unsustainable practices 'must assume their share of responsibility, but any mechanism to insure this must be carefully structured to avoid further adverse employment effects'. International union officials warned that trade union support for targets that affect the workplace and community 'will be contingent on the existence of "just transition" measures that provide, as a minimum: income protection, redundancy procedures, re-employment, and education and retraining' (ICFTU 1997: 1, 5-6).
International union officials declared just transition to be 'the' approach to tackling climate change. The gathering committed unions to 'promoting an integrated approach to sustainable development through a just transition', including social progress, environmental protection and economic needs, democratic governance, respect for labour and other human rights and gender equality (Rosemberg 2010: 141-42 Another, more independent and class-focused element of union climate politics during this period was the increasing importance of mobilising union members for protests going beyond existing government and international climate policy (or at least to push it further and faster).
Pearson ( 
Conclusion
The central question in this research is whether workers organised in trade unions have the interest and capacity to tackle dangerous climate change, and specifically, whether unionised workers can become strategic climate actors. There is prime facie evidence that trade unions in the UK have begun to engage with the political complexities of climate change and indeed to offer some original and innovative paths towards carbon reduction. This is evident in a thoroughgoing focus on climate justice, in distinctive demands for radical political action, in new forms of workplace environmental representation and in forms of popular mobilisation.
However some trade unionists also articulate mainstream framings of climate change. Trade unionists approaching climate change primarily as a market issue tend to emphasise similar concerns to their employers, including the impact on competitiveness, profitability and employment. These union representatives are generally supportive of market-based instruments such as emissions trading, though they are mindful of effects on the viability of the businesses they organise in. Their climate solidarity will tend to be accommodationist towards employers, in the sense defined by labour geographers. Taking neoliberal globalisation as given and in the absence of a global compact, they are likely to fear the effects of 'carbon leakage' for employment.
By contrast, trade unionists orientated towards social integration often embrace the discourse of ecological modernisation, with its pursuit of co-benefits and win-wins for social partners.
They tend to look to the state for an active industrial policy, one that promotes low-carbon technologies and new green jobs, especially in renewable energy. They are concerned with the wider social justice impacts of climate policy, including the effects of higher prices for fuel poverty and with adaptation to climate changes already underway. These union representatives are likely to accommodate more closely with their local states. Finally, other trade unionists take a more explicitly class-orientated approach. They are more critical of existing efforts to tackle climate change and are unwilling to entrust action solely to states and markets. In particular they underline the question of who pays and conceive of existing climate policy as taking measures at the expense of workers. These trade unionists emphasise radical alternative structures and social relations, both domestically and internationally, even when staying within the boundaries of states and capital (such as the workers' plans). They avoid collaboration with employers and the state, but seek an independent stance based on identifiable class interests. They will probably ally with community and other organisations in coalitions and engage in more militant tactics around matters of 'transformative' solidarity.
This research confirms that at the highest levels, UK union climate framing was closest to ecological modernisation during this period. This was particularly clear in union support for the Labour government's Climate Change Act, carbon capture, its 'balanced' energy and aviation policy, and for partnership. Union leaders wanted a more active industrial strategy focused on the development of green technologies and believed the Labour government had been won to that perspective in the last year of its administration. However the election in 2010 and the subsequent Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government put paid to trade union efforts to tie climate and economic crises together. Less prominent, but still significant union framings were located closer to employers and deployed neoliberal market arguments, in particular over EU ETS. Issues such as employment were sometimes posed in narrow, sectional terms or more blatantly in neoliberal terms close to business.
The limited nature of some union climate framing in class terms is clear from the examples cited. A class-based climate approach would have involved unions retaining a high degree of political, ideological and organisational independence from both employers and the state.
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There is some evidence of this in union fiscal policy, public ownership of rail transport and with the mobilisation of union members for climate goals (including opposition to airport expansion). However there are at least three further areas where such an approach was more pronounced. First, union conceptions of just transition and climate jobs have been more consistently class-focused; second, forms of climate representation at work have exhibited elements of working class organisation; and third, union involvement in the Vestas occupation indicated distinctive forms of working class action.
Trade unions are not prisoners of neoliberalism in the realm of climate politics, although they exhibit some accommodation to it. There are more prominent signs that union seek to become swords of climate justice, particularly to effect a just transition to a low carbon economy. More radically, a minority current within trade unionism articulates its own, distinctive, independent and class-focused climate politics. This has perhaps the greatest potential to break out of the current impasse in climate politics and chart and alternative paths for the emerging climate movement.
